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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Respondent disagrees with Appellant's characterization of 
the issues on appeal and submits the following are the issues: 
1. Is the Court mandatorily compelled to invade the joint 
bank account to pay an exempt property allowance or does the 
Court have discretion under U.C.A. 75-6-107? 
a. If discretionaryf are there sufficient facts and 
evidence to support the Court's decision refusing to invade 
jointly held funds? 
2. Was there sufficient evidence to support the Court's 
Findings of Fact set forth in paragraphs 5 and 3 (Ct. File at p. 
173) that the furniture of R.C. Willey's had a value of $2,558 
and was part of the probate estate? 
3. Same issue as set forth in No. 2 above. 
4. Respondent takes no direct issue with this matter and 
believes that it is deminimis non curat lex. The property's 
appraisal was changed from $85 to $135. Respondent believes it 
is not reversible error. 
5. Respondent accepts Appellant's characterization of the 
issue. 
6. Respondent accepts Appellant's characterization of the 
issue. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Decedent, who was a 76 year old widower living in a retire-
ment home, married his 43 year old nurse's aide. Five days after 
his marriage Decedent died. (Ct. File at p. 173).1 
Decedent's nurse's aide Susan Wagley was appointed personal 
representative and is the Appellant herein. The children of 
Susan Wagley from previous marriages were not adopted by Decedent 
and the Court found Decedent had no obligation to support said 
children. (Ct. File at pp. 45-46). 
At least one year prior to Decedent's marriage to Appellant, 
Decedent established two joint accounts with his daughter, Sharon 
Beers, (Respondent herein) one account at Valley Bank and one at 
Davis County Bank in the sum of $8,000 and $10,000, respectively. 
(Ct. File at p. 173). Respondent testified that some of her 
funds were in those accounts. (Hearing, February 14, 1986, Tr. 
p. 66). Respondent further testified that when Decedent estab-
lished the accounts Decedent intended that the funds should pass 
to Respondent upon his death in consideration of Respondent 
caring for her mother and father over the last 15 years through 
their heart attacks, and all types of diseases and illnesses. 
Furthermore, Decedent indicated to Respondent and his other 
daughters that it was his desire to have the money pass to 
1 All references are either to the Court File (Ct. File at 
p. ) with page number following or the Transcripts of 
Hearings before the Court (Hearing date Tr. at p. ). 
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Respondent upon his death. (Hearing, February 14, 1986, Tr. at p. 
69). Five days before Decedent's death and on the day he was to 
marry Appellant, Decedent went to the bank and executed new bank 
documents re-establishing said funds in joint accounts with 
Respondent. (Ct. File at pp. 38-41). 
Ten days before Decedent's marriage to Appellant, Decedent 
withdrew approximately $4,558 in funds from the joint account and 
used $2,558 to purchase new bedroom, refrigerator, and other 
furniture from R. C. Willey (Ct. File at pp. 168-169 and Hearing, 
April 10, 1987, Tr. at pp. 9-12). Said furniture was in the 
possession of Appellant upon Decedent's death and ultimately 
became Appellant's property through a testamentary disposition. 
Respondent Sharon Beers paid all last illness and funeral 
expenses from the joint accounts including: 
Funeral Expense: $2,363.09 
Opening Grave: $ 542.00 
Miscellaneous 
(Visa, Tanners Clinic, 
Merchant Credit, 
Sheriff Ambulance) $ 245.26 
(Ct. File at p. 174). 
Respondent also paid a statutory family allowance in the amount 
of $1,800 pursuant to Court Order of April 1, 1986. (Ct. file at 
pp. 72-73). 
Appellant Susan Wagley received the following: 
a. Insurance proceeds $2,235 (Not part of the estate) 
b. Furniture - $2,558.00 
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c . M i s c e l l a n e o u s p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y $135.00 
d. S t a t u t o r y f a m i l y a l l o w a n c e from j o i n t a c c o u n t 
$ 1 , 8 0 0 . 0 0 
e . P a y m e n t of h e r p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f e e 
$ 3 7 3 . 1 0 . 
f. Payment of her a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s from j o i n t a c c o u n t s 
$ 5 2 1 . 8 4 . (C t . F i l e a t p p . 1 7 0 - 1 7 7 ) . 
g . G i f t s f o r r i n g s , r e n t , money t o t a l i n g a p p r o x i -
m a t e l y $ 5 , 7 7 7 . 2 ( H e a r i n g , F e b r u a r y 14, 1986, T r . a t p . 28) 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the Second Judicial District 
Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on June 
22, 1987, and dismissal of Appellant's appeal. Respondent 
further seeks payment of her reasonable attorney's fees, court 
cost, and expenses in defending this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court had sufficient facts to support its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law following two Evidentiary 
Hearings. The Court is entitled to exercise its sound discretion 
when invading joint party accounts and under the circumstances it 
made a fair and equitable distribution. 
2 While it is not clear from Appellant's testimony, the 
$5,777 probably includes the $2,558 for the R. C. Willey furniture. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
THE COURT IN ITS DISCRETION MAY REFUSE TO 
INVADE A JOINT PARTY BANK ACCOUNT TO MAKE UP 
A DEFICIENCY IN EXEMPT PROPERTY ALLOWANCE. 
Respondent submits that the real issue is whether the Court 
is mandatorily compelled to invade a joint bank account to make 
up any deficiency in an exempt property allowance under U.C.A. 
75-6-107. If the Court has discretionf which Respondent submits 
that it doesf then are there sufficient facts and evidence to 
support the Court's decision to deny the Personal Representa-
tive's request that funds be taken from the joint bank account? 
Respondent has been unable to find any cases interpreting 
U.C.A. 75-6-107 or Section 6-107 of the Uniform Probate Code and 
agrees with Appellant that this is a case of first impression. 
Section 75-6-104 entitled "Right of Survivorship" provides: 
"(1) sums remaining on deposit at the death 
of a party to a joint account belong to the 
surviving party or parties as against the 
estate of the decedent unless there is clear 
and convincing evidence of a different 
intention at the time the account is created 
. . . . 
Section 75-6-101(1) defines "account" as: 
" . . . a contract of deposit of funds between 
a depositor and a financial institution and 
includes a checking accountf savings account, 
certificate of deposit, share account and 
other like arrangement." 
Testimony was presented before the Court on February 14, 1986, by 
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Respondent and her sisters Louise Wagley (Beers)3 and Marcia 
Wagley Starr that the decedent had given the funds to Respondent 
for the purpose that said funds become Respondent's upon his 
demise. (Hearing, February 14, 1986, Tr. pp. 73 and 76-77). A 
portion of the funds in the joint account was contributed by 
Respondent or her spouse. (Hearing, February 14, 1986, Tr. at p. 
66). Testimony was also presented that on the day Decedent 
married his nurse's aide, Decedent, Respondent and Respondent's 
husband met at the bank and submitted new signature cards for the 
account. (Ct. File at pp. 38-41). No evidence was presented 
that Decedent had any other intention than the joint account 
funds would pass to Respondent upon his death. 
Appellant now seeks to have this Court declare that the 
furniture totaling some $2,558 is outside the probate estate. 
Appellant also wants funds in the joint account belonging to 
Respondent taken to pay her $3,500 in cash for the statutory 
exempt property allowance. This would also have the effect of 
ballooning the value of the estate so the personal representative 
fee and attorney's fee would be greater. Any increase in the 
personal representative fee and attorney's fee would be paid from 
the joint account money. 
3
 Clerical error in the court transcripts. Sister's name is 
Lois Wagley Maxfield. 
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Respondent submits t h a t the proper legal standards to be 
applied in interpret ing the probate s t a t u t e s are set for th in 
U.C.A. 75-1-102 which provides: 
"(1) This code shall be liberally construed 
and applied to promote its underlying 
purposes and policies. . . . 
(2) To discover and make effective the 
intent of decedent in distribution of his 
property; . . . " 
U.C.A. 75-1-103 also provides: 
"Unless displaced by the particular pro-
visions of this codef the principles of law 
and equity supplement its provisions." 
U.C.A. 75-1-302(2) further provides: 
"The Court has full power to make orders, 
judgments, and decrees and take all other 
action necessary and proper to administer 
justice in the matters which come before it." 
The law has long recognized that courts may exercise 
"judicial discretion". 
"Judicial discretion is the sound choosing by 
the court, subject to the guidance of the 
law, between doing or not doing a thing, the 
doing of which cannot be demanded as an 
absolute right of the party who asks that it 
be done." 20 Am Jur 2d Courts, Section 69 at 
p. 434 citing Chapman v. Dorsey, 41 N.W.2d 
438,442 (Minn - 1950). 
"Judicial discretion" means sound discretion 
as guided by fixed legal principles. It must 
not be arbitrary or capricious, but must be 
regulated on legal grounds, grounds that will 
make it judicial. It must be compelled by 
conscience, and not by humor. When a judge 
properly exercises his 'judicial discretion1 
he will decide an act according to rules of 
equity, and so as to advance the ends of 
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j u s t i c e " . 23 Words & P h r a s e s , J u d i c i a l 
D i s c r e t i o n a t p . 498 c i t i n g Goodman v . 
Goodman , 236 P . 2d 3 0 5 , 3 0 7 , 60 Nev 511 
(1951). 
" J u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n " means a sound judgment 
which i s not exerc ised a r b i t r a r i l y , but with 
regard to what i s r i g h t and e q u i t a b l e under 
c i rcumstances and law, and which i s d i r e c t e d 
by t h e r e a s o n i n g c o n s c i e n c e of the t r i a l 
judge to a j u s t r e s u l t . " 23 Words & Phrases , 
J u d i c i a l D i s c r e t i o n , 1987 Pocket Supp. at p . 
58 c i t i n g S t a t e v . Grant , 519 P.2d 261,265, 
10 Wash App. 468 (1974). 
The D i s t r i c t Court held e v i d e n t i a r y hea r ings on February 14, 
1986 and Apr i l 10, 1987. On some i s sues the Court ruled aga ins t 
Respondent. Respondent was ordered to pay a family allowance of 
$1,800 as well as A p p e l l a n t ' s Personal R e p r e s e n t a t i v e fees and 
a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . The Court a l so denied Respondent 's reques t t h a t 
c e r t a i n insurance proceeds t o t a l i n g $2,235 be i nc luded in t he 
e s t a t e . On o t h e r i s s u e s the Court ruled for Respondent which 
Appellant by t h i s appeal seeks to r e v e r s e . 
Assuming the exe rc i se of invasion powers i s d i s c r e t i o n a r y , 
did the Court abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n ? Respondent submi t s t h a t 
t h e r e was s u b s t a n t i a l evidence to support the D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s 
d e c i s i o n . Without e l a b o r a t i o n , see g e n e r a l l y : ('1) Hear ing 
T r a n s c r i p t A p r i l 10, 1987, (2) Exhib i t L i s t and Exhib i t s (Ct . 
F i l e a t pp. 168 and 169) , (3) V e r i f i e d W r i t t e n O b j e c t i o n s By 
Respondent to I n v e n t o r y and Accounting, (Ct . F i l e a t pp. 124-
148) , and (4) the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (C t . 
F i l e a t pp. 172-177) . 
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To rule that the Court is mandatorily compelled to invade 
the joint bank accounts would be wrong for the following reasons: 
(1) It would be contrary to the Decedent's intent regarding the 
disposition of his property following his death. (2) It would be 
contrary to the facts and evidence as found by the Court. (3) 
Appellant was not injured due to the personal property she did 
receive amounting to almost $3,000 from Decedent for their five 
day marriage. Appellant also received a family allowance of 
$1,800 from the joint account and the insurance proceeds of 
$2,235 which were found by the Court to be outside the probate 
estate. Appellant also was not required to pay any of the last 
illness and funeral expenses and furthermore, she was paid a fee 
of $373.10 for her time and efforts in probating the estate and 
an attorney's fee of $521.84. Appellant also received gifts from 
Decedent, e.g. rings, money, rent totaling $5,777.4 (4) «p0 tie 
the hands of the Court and compel the Court to invade funds is 
contrary to the manifest legislative intent set forth as a 
preface to the statute to administer "justice in the matters 
which come before it" to "liberally construe the statute" and to 
do "equity". 
The Court should find that the District Court has discre-
tionary power under Section 75-6-107 to invade but is not manda-
torily compelled to do so. Furthermore, discretion which was 
See Footnote 2 supra. 
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exercised by the Second Judicial District Court in the present 
case was supported by substantial evidence and testimony and was 
not abused. 
POINTS II AND III. 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
C O U R T ' S 
PARAGRAPHS 
C. WILLEY' 
FINDINGS 
5 AND 
S HAS A 
3 
OF 
THAT 
VALUE 
FACT 
THE 
OF $2, 
SET FORTH 
FURNITURE OF 
IN 
R. 
, 5 5 8 AND IS PART 
OF THE PROBATE ESTATE. 
The furniture from R. C. Willey's was paid for entirely by 
funds taken from Decedent's account. (Ct. File at pp. 168-169). 
The furniture was purchased approximately 10 days before 
Decedent's death and five days before Decedent married Appellant. 
(Ct. File at p. 168-169, 170). There was no evidence that 
Appellant made any contribution to the purchase of the property. 
U.C.A. 30-2-5 provides generally that neither the husband 
nor the wife are liable for the debts or obligations of the other 
and are entitled to own their own separate property before and 
after marriage. Utah is a common law property state and does not 
recognize community property interest arising out of marriage. 
See generally, Utah Constitution Article XXII, Section 2. 
Testimony was presented by Appellant (Hearing, February 14, 
1986, Tr. at p. 28) that Decedent had made a gift of the furni-
ture to Appellant. The Court made no finding or ruling on this 
point. Furthermore, the Court held a further Evidentiary Hearing 
on April 10, 1987. Evidence was presented that the furniture was 
purchased new from R. C. Willey's for the sum of $2,558, evi-
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denced by cancelled check dated 10 days prior to Decedent's 
death. (Hearing, April 10, 1987, Tr. pp.9-12). No contrary 
evidence was presented regarding the fair market value of the 
furniture purchased from R. C. Willey's. Respondent submits that 
the Court's Findings of Fact set forth in Paragraphs 5 and 3 (Ct. 
File at p. 173) are supported by the evidence and testimony 
presented before the Court. It was not an abuse of discretion of 
the Court in holding that the value of the property was $2,558 
and the furniture was fully part of the probate estate. 
The case of Gorrell v. Gorrell, 62 Utah Advance Report 30 
(Utah Court Appeals - 1987) is determinative of the issue. The 
Court of Appeals held that the ownership of a cash asset as 
between decedent and her surviving spouse was a factual issue to 
be decided by the Court with neither party having a particular 
burden to go forward and establish ownership. In Gorrell the 
parties were married for over 22 years and Respondent believes 
that no credible evidence or testimony was presented by the bank 
in Gorrell to determine that the cash asset belonged to the 
parties jointly or to the estate. As is the case in this matter, 
there is no evidence before the District Court to support a 
finding or conclusion or to the extent there was evidence, the 
Court did not so find or conclude that the R. C. Willey furniture 
belonged to Appellant in any degree. 
The standard of review under these circumstances is arti-
11 
culated by this Court in Smith v. Utah Central Credit Union, 727 
P.2d 219, (Utah - 1986) as follows: 
"When an appellant challenges the failure of 
the trier of fact to accept his version of 
the facts, our review is strictly limited. 
We view the evidence and its inferences in a 
light most favorable to the judgment and 
findings. They will not be disturbed when 
based upon substantial, competent, admissible 
evidence. Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714 
(Utah - 1985). When the evidence conflicts, 
we necessarily give deference to the fact 
finder and acknowledge his advantageous 
position vis-a-vis the witnesses, the 
evidence, and the parties. DeVas v. Noble, 
13 Utah 2d 133, 137; 369 P.2d 290, 293 (Utah 
- 1962). at p. 220. 
Respondent disagrees with Appellant that the question turns 
on whether the R. C. Willey furniture issue is a question of 
ownership by Appellant and Decedent as joint tenants, or tenants 
in the entireties. 
"Estates by entireties do not exist in some 
jurisdictions, sometimes on theories of 
public policy, sometimes by express statutory 
provision, sometimes on the theory that the 
Married Women's Acts have abolished the unity 
of husband and wife and, hence, the reason 
for estates by the entireties, and sometimes 
by the combined effect of a Married Women's 
Act and a statute of descent construed to 
abolish survivorship in such estates." 41 Am 
Jur 2d, Husband and Wife, Section 56 at p. 
61. 
The Court made no factual findings that Appellant and 
Decedent owned the furniture as joint tenants. The Findings of 
the Court set forth in paragraphs 5 and 3 are supported by the 
evidence and should be affirmed. 
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POINT IV. 
RESPONDENT TAKES NO DIRECT ISSUE WITH 
APPELLANT'S FOURTH ISSUE AND BELIEVES THAT IT 
IS DEMINIMIS NON CURAT LEX. 
The p r o p e r t y ' s a p p r a i s a l was changed from $85 t o $135 upon a 
s u a s p o n t e o r d e r o f t h e S e c o n d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t . 
R e s p o n d e n t t a k e s no i s s u e w i t h t h i s m a t t e r as i t i s d e m i n i m i s non 
c u r a t l e x . Respondent b e l i e v e s i t i s n o t r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . 
POINT V. 
FUNDS FROM THE JOINT PARTY ACCOUNTS OF 
DECEDENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMINISTERED BY 
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AS PART OF THE 
ESTATE. 
R e s p o n d e n t g e n e r a l l y s u b m i t s t h a t i t s a n a l y s i s s e t f o r t h i n 
P o i n t I . i s d e t e r m i n a t i v e o f t h i s m a t t e r . U . C . A . 7 5 - 6 - 1 0 7 
p r o v i d e s in p a r t : 
" . . . s u m s r e c o v e r e d by t h e p e r s o n a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a l l be a d m i n i s t e r e d as p a r t 
o f the d e c e d e n t ' s e s t a t e . " 
The o p e r a t i v e word of the s t a t u t e i s " r e c o v e r e d " . The sums were 
n o t " r e c o v e r e d " u n t i l t h e C o u r t made a j u d i c i a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
t h a t f u n d s i n t h e j o i n t p a r t y a c c o u n t w o u l d be t a k e n f o r 
A p p e l l a n t ' s b e n e f i t . 
F o l l o w i n g t h e F e b r u a r y 1 4 , 1986 h e a r i n g , R e s p o n d e n t was 
o r d e r e d t o pay a s t a t u t o r y f a m i l y a l l o w a n c e o f $ 1 , 8 0 0 which was 
p a i d by Respondent from the j o i n t a c c o u n t . ( C t . F i l e a t p . 4 6 ) . 
The Court s p e c i f i c a l l y r u l e d t h a t no o t h e r f u n d s w e r e t o be 
w i t h d r a w n from the j o i n t a c c o u n t e x c e p t t o pay c r e d i t o r s u n t i l 
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further Order of the Court. (Ct. File at p. 47). Following the 
April 10, 1987 hearing. Respondent paid the Personal 
Representative's fees and her attorney's fees pursuant to Order 
of the Court. (Ct. File at p. 170 et. seq.) . Since Section 75-6-
107 speaks in terms of "no proceeding to assert this liability 
shall be commenced" the funds were not "recovered" until a 
proceeding was commenced and there was a court adjudication of 
what funds must be taken from the joint party accounts. Follow-
ing the adjudication, said funds were delivered and ostensibly 
administered by the Personal Representative under the facts of 
the present situation. Respondent agrees with the statement of 
Appellant in its brief on p. 29: 
"Appellant does not claim that either the 
estate or the personal representative 
suffered any monetary loss as a result of the 
funds not being administered as part of the 
estate." 
Respondent also takes umbrage that Appellant as a personal 
representative claims that she should have administered the funds 
since Respondent was compelled (at no compensation) to spend a 
great deal of time communicating with the creditor/claimants of 
the estate to resolve the affairs and pay their claims, and to 
solicit information from insurance companies and Social Security 
to settle estate matters. Respondent made numerous requests upon 
Appellant as Personal Representative to deal with the affairs of 
the estate which Respondent believes was not done. Appellant was 
appointed Personal Representative on March 10, 1986, by Order of 
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the Court over objection from Respondent. (Ct. File at pp. 67-
69). U.C.A. 75-3-705 requires the personal representative to 
file an Inventory and Appraisement within three (3) months after 
appointment. Six (6) months after Appellant's appointment as 
Personal Representative, Respondent through her attorney filed a 
Motion to Compel the Personal Representative to file an Inventory 
and Accounting. The Motion was filed on October 10f 1986. (Ct. 
Pile at pp. 87-88). The Inventory was ultimately filed on 
February 8, 1987, eleven (11) months after appointment. (Ct. 
File at pp. 113-120). Furthermore, Respondent believes that 
Appellant in calculating her Personal Representative fee and the 
fee of her attorney improperly included amounts that the Personal 
Representative expected to obtain from the joint accounts for 
those fees in the gross value of the estate thereby ballooning 
the estate to a greater amount and a greater Personal Representa-
tive fee and attorney's fee. This had the effect of calculating 
a percentage on a percentage. See generally: Ct. file at p. 109 
and Respondent's Written Objections at Ct. File at p. 128. 
In conclusion, Respondent submits that under U.C.A. 75-6-107 
"sums recovered" were not recovered until there was a court 
adjudication that Appellant was entitled to invade the joint 
party accounts. 
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POINT VI . 
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON 
MULTIPLE PARTY ACCOUNT FUNDS. 
Respondent b e l i e v e s t h a t A p p e l l a n t i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o an 
award of i n t e r e s t unde r any s t a t u t e based on i t s a n a l y s i s s e t 
f o r t h in P o i n t V. h e r e o f . S imply , t he funds were not r e c o v e r e d 
u n t i l t h e r e was a j u d i c i a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e amount to be 
t a k e n from t h e m u l t i p l e p a r t y a c c o u n t s . To t h e b e s t of 
R e s p o n d e n t ' s knowledge , t h i s i s s u e i s o n l y r a i s e d for the f i r s t 
t ime on a p p e a l . T h e r e f o r e , A p p e l l a n t i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o any 
i n t e r e s t . 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Second Judicial District Court should be 
affirmed in all particulars as the Court in the proper exercise 
of its discretion had substantial facts and evidence upon which 
to support its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Most of 
the issues raised by Appellant on appeal are without merit, and 
are immaterial and their determination does not have a signifi-
cant bearing on the state of the law in Utah or the circumstances 
of this case. Respondent submits that it ought to recover its 
reasonable attorney's fees and(costs in defending this appeal. 
DATED this / day of November, 1987. 
UNQRIC{!T,/RAWLE & DEAMER 
/^>P^^y^ 
jamer 
:o rneys for Respondent 
laron Beers 
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I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SHARON BEERS, this 
/0 day of November, 1987, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Daniel L. Wilson \ 
Attorney for Appellant 
290 25th Street, #204\ 
Ogden, Utah 84401 \ 
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